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Abstract
he phasing out of the sale of new conventional petrol and die-
sel vehicles by a given date is one of a number of potentially 
disruptive policies that have been announced over the past 
ive years. While the UK has opted for a target year of 2040 
other jurisdictions have announced more challenging target 
dates (2025: Norway, Paris; 2030: Germany; 2032: Scotland) 
and scope (petrol and diesel, diesel only, non-electric). here 
is lack of robust analysis that examines the various targets and 
phase outs in terms of the key trade-ofs in improving carbon 
emissions, air quality, and public health at various scales. here 
are also important issues around public acceptability, includ-
ing how people buy cars and vans, how cars and vans need to 
be sold, accessed and utilised in order to accelerate turnover 
in the leet. hese need further investigation through the lens 
of ‘disruption’. his paper investigates a number of alternative 
futures around the proposed ban on conventional fossil fuelled 
vehicles in the UK. By doing so it explores how such a strat-
egy/ban can be achieved while maximising ‘co beneits’; what 
the impacts might be if the Government were more ambitious; 
how much ‘disruption’ is needed; and what the implications of 
diferent consumer acceptability scenarios are. We used estab-
lished modelling techniques and prospective scenario analysis 
to explore existing and alternative disruptive strategies with the 
view to achieve near ‘zero emissions’ and much improved air 
quality from light duty vehicles by 2050. he results suggest 
that the existing, relatively unambitious 2040 ban on internal 
combustion engine cars and vans can be achieved by essentially 
doing what we are doing anyway (continuous change) whereas 
more ambitious bans (e.g. 2030, and including hybrids) would 
require some ‘disruptive’ change within the existing socio-
technical system. We conclude by discussing and mapping the 
policy options in terms of disruption for government, industry 
and consumers.
Introduction
he transport sector has a signiicant dependence on oil, with a 
share of 95 % of all global transport energy use in 2015, and this 
has not changed since the 1970s (IEA 2018). In the UK, energy 
use from transport has increased 16.1 % since 1990, against 
an economy-wide decrease of 4.1 % and net carbon emissions 
are unchanged (BEIS 2018; CCC 2018b). Transport is also the 
largest carbon-emitting sector of the UK economy with 28 % of 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2017 (BEIS 2018; CCC 2018b). As 
emissions in other sectors have reduced, transport has grown 
as a share of overall emissions with no net reduction since 1990 
vis a vis a 43 % reduction for all sectors combined. A lack of 
progress with heavy goods vehicles and aviation persists, but 
the unexpected change is the increase in new car CO
2
 (SMMT 
2018). Switching from diesel accounts for a small proportion 
of this increase; the main culprit is a continued swing towards 
larger passenger cars, particularly Sports Utility Vehicles 
(SUV). Electric vehicles only account for 3  % of sales, with 
three out of four sold being plug-in hybrid electric vehicles 
(PHEVs), which have shown to perform little better in terms 
of carbon emissions than the most eicient conventional ICE 
vehicles in real world conditions (Plötz et al. 2018a, 2018b). 
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Despite well-established pockets of electriication (light and 
heavy rail) and slowly evolving ones (light duty vehicles and 
motorised two-wheelers), scenario exercises by fuel companies, 
international energy agencies, environmental NGOs and utility 
companies all come to uncannily similar conclusions about the 
transport sector – a lot of fossil fuel will still be burnt globally 
within the sector in 2050 and beyond (AEA Technology 2009; 
CCC 2015; IEA 2011, 2015; Köhler et al. 2009; OLEV 2013; 
Sims et al. 2014). Widespread electriication is proving to be 
a very slow process of continuous change and is likely to be 
too slow to contribute meaningfully to meeting ambitious 
climate change mitigation targets. Sprei (2018) argued that 
the largest disruptive potential lies in the combination of 
three major innovations of widespread electriication, shared 
mobility and automation. However, the author acknowledges 
that “technology and innovations alone will not be suicient 
to create a new sustainable transportation system, regulations 
will also be necessary”.
To accelerate the transition to low carbon transport system, 
the phasing out of the sale of new conventional petrol and die-
sel vehicles by a given date is one of a number of potentially 
‘disruptive’ regulatory policies that have been announced over 
the past ive years. Several countries and cities have committed 
to phasing out conventional vehicles between 2025 and 2040 
(WorldAtlas 2018), with manufacturers also announcing tar-
gets (Reiter and Parkin 2019). A long awaited report by the UK 
Department for Transport (the ‘Road to Zero’ strategy, or R2Z), 
expected to address decarbonisation of the transport sector as 
a whole, turned out to focus on roads only, with the major em-
phasis on passenger cars (DfT 2018). his included an ambi-
tion for ultra-low emission vehicle (ULEV) sales of 50–70 % 
by 2030, and 40 % for vans, ahead of a ban on sales of diesel 
and petrol cars and vans by 2040. Criticism was immediate and 
widespread. Firstly, there remains ambiguity over the deinition 
of an ULEV, leaving the door open for hybrid electric vehicle 
(HEV) sales ater 2040.1 Secondly, the 2040 target is weak by 
international standards, with many calling for this to be intro-
duced a decade earlier (CCC 2018a; House of Commons 2018). 
hirdly, the policies identiied to achieve this are deemed by 
many to be inadequate. hese include improvements to charg-
ing infrastructure, maintenance of grants for some ULEV pur-
chases and potential reforms to vehicle tax. he ambition set 
for vehicle eiciency and fuel decarbonisation falls far short 
of the scientiic evidence on what is required to meet carbon 
targets. With 60 % of UK surface transport’s carbon emitted by 
the car leet, the sector is pivotal to any post-Paris programme 
of action. Notwithstanding the most optimistic predictions of 
carbon intensity based on the new test cycle igures, and the 
recently agreed cuts in new car and van CO
2
 by 2030 (-37.5 % 
and -31 % over 2021 levels for cars and vans respectively)2, the 
mix of cars sold for the next decade or two will lock in fossil 
fuels for some time to come (Morgan 2019).
1. In the UK Ultra Low Emission Vehicle (ULEV) is the term used to describe any 
vehicle that: uses low carbon technologies; emits less than 75 g of CO
2
/km from 
the tailpipe; and is capable of operating in zero tailpipe emission mode for a range 
of at least 10 miles (16.1 km).
2. The European Council agreed in late 2018 that from 2030 onwards-new cars will 
be allowed to emit on average 37.5 % less CO
2
 and new vans will emit on average 
31 % less CO
2
 compared to 2021 levels. Between 2025 and 2029, both cars and 
vans will be required to emit 15 % less CO
2
.
Overall, there is lack of robust analysis that examines the 
various targets and phase outs in terms of the key trade-ofs 
in improving carbon emissions, air quality, and public health 
at various scales (national, subnational, city). here are also 
important issues around public acceptability, including how 
people buy cars, how cars need to be sold, accessed and uti-
lised in order to accelerate turnover in the leet. hese need 
further investigation through the lens of ‘disruption’. his paper 
therefore aims to investigate transitions away from carbon-
intensive car and van transport by exploring ‘disruptive’ 
rates of change in comparison with ‘natural’ rates of change. 
he main objectives are:
• To represent and explore disruptive/discontinuous change 
in transport energy systems;
• To explore scenarios of disruptive and more incremental 
change in decarbonising car and van based transport in the 
UK;
• To assess how disruptive and/or continuous the scenarios 
may be for key stakeholders of the socio-technical system 
(who, when, reach and signiicance).
By doing so it explores what the impacts might be if the Gov-
ernment were more ambitious (reach and signiicance); how 
much ‘disruption’ is needed to meet ambitious carbon targets; 
and who (manufacturers and industry, users and civil society, 
and government itself) might be efected when.
Approach, methods and data
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
We have used a socio-technical approach to organise policy op-
tions and map their efects on the transport-energy system. he 
starting point was Greg Unruh’s Techno Institutional Complex 
framework, which has been used to explain the failed difusion 
of ‘carbon free technologies’ (Unruh 2000, 2002). According 
to Unruh techno-institutional ‘lock-in’ is a persistent state that 
creates systemic market and policy barriers to technological 
alternatives and occurs through combined interactions among 
technological systems and governing institutions (Unruh 2000, 
2002). Unruh distinguishes between transition stages as being 
either end-of-pipe (incremental), continuous (non-disruptive) 
or discontinuous (disruptive or radical). he original frame-
work (Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla 2006) had two axes of 
organisation: degree of disruption (continuity → disruption) 
and degree of lock-in (developing → industrialised). In line with 
socio-technical studies (e.g. Smith et al. 2005; Yuan et al. 2012), 
we adapted the latter to degree or level of coordination so that 
the adapted framework maps policy scenarios by their degree 
of disruption (continuity → disruption) and the level of coordi-
nation (emergent transformation → purposive transition). As 
we will see later (Figure 5), the framework was considered as a 
tool for organizing policy analysis within the context of large 
transport-energy based-systems.
he levels of disruption and coordination may vary according 
to the actors involved or impacted on. For instance, high and 
wide ranging EV subsidies (as in Norway) may mean continuity 
for some actors (e.g. non-car owners, but also car owners) but 
potential disruption for others (e.g. vehicle manufacturers and 
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their supply chains, central government). Our analysis therefore 
distinguishes between four categories of actors:
1. Technology providers, industry and business (e.g. car man-
ufacturers, leasing companies);
2. Consumers (largely owners and users of cars or vans);
3. Organizations and institutions in policy and planning (cen-
tral government, local government);
4. Wider civil society (not everybody owns or uses a car or van).
MODELLING ‘DISRUPTION’ AND ‘CONTINUITY’ IN THE TRANSPORT-
ENERGY SYSTEM 
Disruption and continuity within the transport-energy system 
was modelled using an established modelling tool suitable for 
policy analysis, the Transport Energy and Air pollution Model 
for the UK (TEAM-UK). TEAM-UK is a disaggregated, bot-
tom-up modelling framework of the British transport-energy-
environment system, built around a set of exogenous scenarios 
of socio-economic, socio-technical and political developments. 
It integrates a transport demand simulation model, household 
car ownership model, consumer segmented vehicle choice 
model, vehicle leet evolution model and vehicle and fuel life 
cycle emissions model in a single scenario modelling frame-
work. he model projects transport demand and supply, for all 
passenger and freight modes of transport, and calculates the 
corresponding energy use, life cycle emissions and environ-
mental impacts year-by-year up to 2100 (NB: the time hori-
zon for this study was 2012 to 2050). To date, the underlying 
transport-energy-environment system modelling framework 
has been applied in a number of prospective scenario (Anable 
et al. 2012; Brand et al. 2019; Brand et al. 2017) and policy 
(Brand et al. 2013) modelling studies.
TEAM-UK represents an enhanced version of the UK 
Transport Carbon Model (Brand et al. 2012) – the main im-
provements include a wider range of outcome measures (air 
and noise pollution, land use change) and a more detailed 
passenger transport demand model. A detailed description is 
beyond the scope of this paper; and most of the methods have 
been published elsewhere (Brand 2016; Brand et al. 2017; 
Brand et al. 2012). Briely, the transport demand model simu-
lates passenger travel demand as a function of key travel indi-
cators structured around data obtained from the UK National 
Travel Survey (Department for Transport 2016), including the 
average number of trips and average distance travelled per 
person per year. hese were further disaggregated by seven 
main trip purposes (commuting, business, long distance lei-
sure, local leisure, school/education, shopping, other), eight 
trip lengths (Under 1 mile, 1–2 miles, 2–5 miles, 5–10 miles, 
10–25  miles, 25–50  miles, 50–100  miles, and More than 
100 miles) and twelve modes of passenger transport (walk, bi-
cycle, car/van driver, car/van passenger, motorcycle, local bus, 
coach, rail and underground, other private, taxi, domestic air, 
other public). International air travel is modelled separately 
as a function of income (GDP/capita), population and supply 
and policy costs. Freight demand is simulated as a function 
economic activity (GDP/capita) and population, with refer-
ence demand elasticities taken from a RAND Europe study 
(Dunkerley et al. 2014).
he vehicle leet turnover model provides projections of how 
vehicle technologies evolve over time for 770 vehicle technology 
categories, including 283 car and 90 van (up to 7.5t) technolo-
gies such as increasingly eicient gasoline internal combustion 
vehicles (ICV), battery electric vehicles (BEV), plug-in hybrid 
electric vehicles (PHEV) and hydrogen (H
2
) fuel cell electric 
vehicles (FCEV). he car leet model is the most detailed, in-
cluding market (private vs. leet/company, three car sizes/seg-
ments) and consumer segmentation (four private and two leet/
company segments). New vehicle choice is modelled using a 
hybrid discrete choice and consumer segmentation model, as 
described in Brand et al. (2017). New car sales are a function 
of endogenously derived household car ownership and car 
scrappage, with the latter modelled as a function of average life 
expectancy via a S-shaped (modiied Weibull) scrappage prob-
ability curve (Zachariadis et al. 2001). Based on existing age 
distributions, average car age was assumed to stay at 6.3 years, 
with 6.0 years for vans.3 Total car ownership is modelled based 
on established methods (DfT 2013; Whelan 2007) taking into 
account household income, average vehicle costs, household 
location (urban, rural) and car ownership saturation rates for 
multiple car ownership.
he energy and emissions model calculates fuel and energy 
consumption as well as pollutant emissions for eight direct pol-
lutants (carbon dioxide, CO
2
, methane, CH
4
, carbon monoxide, 
CO, sulphur dioxide, SO
2
, nitrogen oxides, NO
X
, non-methane 
volatile organic compounds, NMVOC and particulates, PM) 
arising from the operation of vehicles by using the established 
emissions factor method underlying COPERT (EEA 2012, 
2017). his is most detailed for road vehicles, where emissions 
are based on average-speed emissions-curves for ‘hot’ emis-
sions as well as excess emissions from ‘cold starts’ (ibid.). It 
allows modelling the combined efects of diferent leet com-
positions, diferent sets of emission factors, traic characteris-
tics, cold starts, fuel quality, fuel blending (e.g. diesel/biodiesel 
blends) and driver behaviour.
Last but not least, TEAM-UK includes a life cycle inventory 
(LCI) model and an environmental impacts assessment (EIA) 
model based on a typical environmental life cycle assessment 
framework (ICO 2006). he life cycle inventory model calcu-
lates energy use and emissions (including primary energy and 
land use) for the manufacture, maintenance and disposal of 
vehicles; the construction, maintenance, and disposal of infra-
structure; and the supply of energy (fuels). his adds 18 un-
regulated air pollutants and land use change indicators. he 
environmental impacts assessment model then provides an 
assessment of the damage caused by calculating impact indica-
tors (e.g. global warming potential) and lower/upper bounds of 
external costs (e.g. damage costs to human health, social cost of 
carbon). Further details on methods and data for the LCI/EIA 
models are given in Brand (2016).
3. The UK car leet age proile implied a 50 % scrappage probability was for cars 
or vans that were about 16 years old.
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SCENARIO ANALYSIS: THE CASE OF THE BAN ON NEW CONVENTIONAL 
FOSSIL FUEL VEHICLES
TEAM-UK was applied in a UK case study to compare policy 
options and map their efects on the transport-energy system 
in terms of impacts on leet evolution, energy use, carbon/air 
quality emissions and revenue streams under the framing of 
disruption outlined above. he starting point was the so-called 
‘Reference’ scenario, which depicted existing policy and plans 
but without the proposed ban on new conventional fossil fuel 
cars and vans. Six alternative scenarios were then developed 
and quantiied, each with a diferent policy ambition in terms of 
(a) target date and (b) deinition of what constitutes an ULEV. 
We explored two target dates (2040 and 2030) and three ULEV 
deinitions (ICE ban, ICE+HEV ban, ICE+HEV+PHEV ban), 
generating a total of seven policy scenarios as summarized in 
Table 1. he main assumptions for the Reference and alterna-
tive scenarios are described in Appendix A1. It is worth noting 
that the electricity generation mix for all scenarios follows cen-
tral government projections (mainly natural gas, wind, nuclear, 
solar – with some CCS coal and gas ater 2030), implying the 
carbon content of retail electricity (including transmission and 
distribution losses of about 7 %) is gradually decreasing from 
about 390 gCO
2
/kWh in 2015 to 157 gCO
2
/kWh and 127 gCO
2
/
kWh by 2030 and 2050 respectively. 
Results and Discussion
FLEET TURNOVER AND ULEV UPTAKE
Without a ban or further policy action (i.e. the Reference case), 
ULEV cars and vans (= BEV and PHEV) increase their market 
share from approx. 2 % in 2018 to about 14 % by 2030, then 
levelling of (Figure 1, let). 
In contrast, the ban scenarios suggest that petrol and diesel 
ICE cars and vans are gradually phased out of the market as 
the policy signal of the impending ban on conventional vehi-
cles bears fruit. his happens, of course, at diferent rates and 
scales depending on the ambition of the ban and underlying 
policies. Firstly, in the ICE-only bans (that allow conventional 
HEVs to be sold beyond the ban date), the shit towards UL-
Table 1. Narratives and key assumptions for the alternative scenarios for phasing out ‘conventional’ fossil fuel cars and vans in the UK.
Ban sale of non-ULEV cars and vans from
ULEV def. 2040 2030
ICE ban ICE ban 2040 (RZ1):
Availability of new conventional petrol and diesel 
ICE cars and vans is drying up from 2035, with no 
ICE vehicle sold from 2040 onwards.
No change in Reference (REF) assumption for the 
plug in vehicle grant or other incentives.
ICE ban 2030 (RZ1a):
Availability of new conventional petrol and diesel 
ICE cars and vans is drying up from 2025, with no 
ICE vehicle sold from 2030 onwards.
Modestly improved market conditions for EVs 
(consumer awareness, charging infrastructure, 
increased range of makes and models) from mid-
2020s onwards.
ICE+HEV ban ICE+HEV ban 2040 (RZ2):
Availability of ICE and HEV cars and vans is drying 
up from 2035, with no ICE or HEV vehicle sold from 
2040 onwards.
Much improved market conditions for EVs incl. uni-
versal consumer awareness by 2035, increased 
FHUWDLQW\RIDFFHVVIRUÀHHWRSHUDWLRQVXSWR
higher battery capacities, charging rates and faster 
off-street parking from the late 2020s onwards.
ICE+HEV ban 2030 (RZ2a):
Availability of ICE and HEV cars and vans is drying 
up from 2025, with no ICE or HEV vehicle sold from 
2030 onwards.
Much improved market conditions for EVs incl. uni-
versal consumer awareness by 2025, increased 
DQGHDUOLHUFHUWDLQW\RIDFFHVVIRUÀHHWRSHUDWLRQV
higher battery capacities, charging rates and faster 
off-street parking from the mid-2020s onwards.
ICE+HEV 
+PHEV ban
ICE+HEV+PHEV ban 2040 (RZ3):
Availability of ICE, HEV and PHEV cars and vans 
is drying up from 2035, with no ICE, HEV or PHEV 
vehicle sold from 2040 onwards.
Much improved market conditions for EVs incl. 
FRQVXPHUDZDUHQHVVDQGFHUWDLQW\RIDF-
FHVVIRUÀHHWRSHUDWLRQVE\KLJKHUEDWWHU\
capacities, charging rates and faster off-street 
parking from the late 2020s onwards.
ICE+HEV+PHEV ban 2030 (RZ3a):
Availability of ICE, HEV and PHEV cars and vans 
is drying up from 2025, with no ICE, HEV or PHEV 
vehicle sold from 2030 onwards.
Much improved market conditions for EVs incl. 
FRQVXPHUDZDUHQHVVDQGFHUWDLQW\RIDF-
FHVVIRUÀHHWRSHUDWLRQVE\KLJKHUEDWWHU\
capacities, charging rates and faster off-street 
parking from the mid-2020s onwards.
Reference 
(comparison 
scenario)
REF: Projection of transport demand, supply, energy use and emissions as if there were no changes to 
existing transport and energy policy.
No ban. Consumers increasingly shy away from diesels post Dieselgate (Brand 2016). Existing UK plug-
LQYHKLFOHJUDQW2/(9IRUFDUVYDQVWD[LVDQGPRWRUF\FOHVXSWRIRUFDUVGHSHQGLQJRQ
how plugged-in the vehicle is) to phase out by the late 2020s. Consumer awareness of EVs increases 
WRaE\PLGVWKHQOHYHOVRXW&HUWDLQW\RIDFFHVVWRFKDUJLQJIRUÀHHWRSHUDWLRQVVWD\VDW
3ULYDWHDFFHVVWRRYHUQLJKWFKDUJLQJOHYHODW6HH%UDQGHWDOIRUGHWDLOHGDVVXPSWLRQVRIWKH
Reference case.
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EVs is modest and driven by the ‘leet’ and ‘enthusiast’ markets 
(Brand et al. 2017), with shares of new ULEVs up to 26 % (ICE 
ban 2040) and 49 % (ICE ban 2030) once the bans have been 
introduced. Secondly, in the more ambitious bans that include 
ICE and HEV vehicles, private, company and leet buyers in-
creasingly prefer ULEVs over conventional ICE and HEV vehi-
cles, fuelled by a co-evolving EV market with increasing avail-
ability and performance of lower carbon vehicles and growing 
investment in home and fast recharging infrastructure. In the 
ICE+HEV ban 2040, ULEV take-up by the early adopter and 
mass markets and so-called ‘user-choosers’ (Brand et al. 2017) 
starting in the late 2020s mean that ULEV vehicle sales reach 
the 50 % mark by the early 2030s, with 100 % take-up by 2040 
as expected by the policy. Moving the ban date forward to 2030 
(ICE+HEV ban 2030) increases the rate and scale of the transi-
tion to plug-in vehicles, with nearly 50 % of sales being ULEV 
by 2027 and 100 % take-up by 2030. hirdly, when also includ-
ing PHEV in the bans the results do not change much from the 
ICE+HEV bans, which showed low take-up rates of PHEV in 
favour of BEVs. he main diference is that ULEV are taken up 
1 or 2 years earlier than in the ICE+HEV scenarios. So, overall 
we would expect little change in the early 2020s but a profound 
shit in vehicle buyers’ technology preferences and choices in 
the late 2020s (earlier ban) or late 2030s (later ban).
In terms of meeting the objectives of the UK Government’s 
‘Road to Zero’ (R2Z) strategy (DfT 2018), the results suggest 
that the R2Z ‘mission’ for all new cars and vans to be ‘efectively 
zero emission’ by 2040 – and the R2Z ‘ambition’ of 50 % new 
‘ULEV’ by 2030 – would only be met by including HEVs in 
the ban.4
he continued sale of conventional ICE and HEV petrol 
and diesel vehicles – and relatively lower shares of ULEVs in 
the leet – implies that there would still be a lot of fossil fuel 
cars and vans on the road in 2050, particularly in the ICE ban 
scenarios (Figure 1, right). As for diesels, we expect between 
zero (ICE+HEV ban 2030, ICE+HEV+PHEV ban 2030) and 
4.0 million (ICE ban 2040) vehicles on the road in 2050. While 
this is signiicantly lower than the total leet of 11.4 million die-
sel cars and vans in the Reference case, it suggests that an efec-
tive phasing out of fossil fuelled cars and vans by 2050 may only 
4. The strategy sets an interim ambition for ultra-low emission vehicle sales (UL-
EVs) of 50–70 per cent by 2030, and 40 per cent for vans, ahead of a ban on diesel 
and petrol cars and vans by 2040.
happen with earlier ban target dates and a stricter deinition of 
what constitutes a ULEV (ICE+HEV 2030, ICE+HEV+PHEV 
2030). his conirms other work, including by the Committee 
on Climate Change, which sums up the critique of most as fol-
lows: 
Leaving open the possibility of sales of conventional hybrids 
and very short range plug-in hybrids in 2040 and follow-
ing years is inconsistent with the UK’s climate change com-
mitments. To meet the Government’s stated goal of every 
car and van being zero emission in 2050, only pure battery 
electric vehicles and long range plug in hybrids can be sold 
ater 2035. (CCC 2018a)
PROGRESS TOWARDS MEETING EMISSIONS TARGETS 
Figure 2 (let) shows tailpipe (direct, at source) CO
2
e emissions 
from UK cars and vans for the seven scenarios compared to 
the current (80 %) and potential Paris target (95 %) for 2050.5 
his clearly shows the ‘R2Z’ (ICE ban 2040) may neither hit the 
targets nor make the early gains needed for a 1.5°C trajectory, 
suggesting the strategy may achieve too little, too late.
Progress towards existing and future 1.5 °C targets across the 
range of bans was mixed – with the latter only met in the earlier 
and more stringent ban. he largest and earliest savings were in 
the ICE+HEV and ICE+HEV+PHEV bans by 2030. Speciically, 
the earlier ban that included ICE and HEV resulted in 20 % and 
82 % reductions in tailpipe CO
2
 emissions by 2030 and 2050 
when compared to the ‘R2Z’ scenario (ICE ban 2040). Total 
reductions of this scenario against 1990 levels were 32 % (2030) 
and 93 % (2050), compared to 16 % (2030) and 37 % (2050) in 
the Reference case. he 2040 target scenarios reached similar 
reductions only in the second half of the assessment period. 
Figure 2 (right) shows life cycle CO
2
e emissions from UK 
cars and vans for the seven scenarios. his clearly shows that 
adding upstream and downstream CO
2
e emissions from ve-
hicle manufacture, maintenance & disposal and the supply 
of energy (fossil fuel production, electricity generation) basi-
cally shits the emissions trajectories up by between 30 and 
40 MtCO
2
 p.a. his is largely due to total upstream and down-
5. Based on baseline 1990 emissions of 70.3 MtCO
2
 for cars and 11.5 MtCO
2
 for 
vans, i.e. a total of 81.8 MtCO
2
. Assuming national targets were shared equally 
across the economy and the transport sector, the legislated -80 % and Paris ‘near 
zero’ -95 % targets were 16.4 MtCO
2
 and 4.1 MtCO
2
 respectively. 
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Figure 1. Scenario comparison of the share of sales (left) and total fleet (right) of ULEV cars and vans.
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stream CO
2
e emissions (vehicle and fuel LCA data based on 
Kay et al. 2013) remaining roughly constant over time as 
emissions from the generation and distribution of electric-
ity replace those from fossil fuel production and distribution. 
As mentioned above the carbon content of retail electricity 
is gradually decreasing from about 390 gCO
2
/kWh in 2015 
to 157 gCO
2
/kWh in 2030 and further to 127 gCO
2
/kWh by 
2050. While the increase in electricity use in the high electrii-
cation scenarios is signiicant (see also Figure 4), the decrease 
in the carbon content coupled with decreases in upstream 
emissions from fossil fuel production balance each other out. 
Further analysis showed that the combined upstream carbon 
emission from electricity generation and fossil fuel produc-
tion decreased from 21.9 MtCO
2
e in 2015 to between 17.4 Mt-
CO
2
e (all 2030 ban scenarios) and 18.4 MtCO
2
e (Reference 
and ICE ban 2040) by 2030. By 2050, this decreased further 
to between 10.9 MtCO
2
e (ICE+HEV ban 2030) and 12.8 Mt-
CO
2
e (ICE ban 2040), which is lower than the 15.1 MtCO
2
e 
in the Reference case. So, upstream fossil fuel emissions were 
replaced by somewhat lower electricity generation emissions. 
It is worth noting that not all of upstream and downstream 
emissions are within the UK boundaries or accounts; there-
fore, a direct comparison with national climate change targets 
is inappropriate. 
PROGRESS TOWARDS IMPROVING AIR QUALITY
he bans on the sale of conventional fossil fuel cars and vans 
explored here can accelerate reductions in air quality emissions 
in the medium to long term, but not the short term. Figure 3 
(NO
X
 on let, PM
2.5
 on right) clearly shows downward trends 
for all scenarios in the short term, largely due to lower emis-
sion ICE and HEV (and some plug-in) vehicles replacing older 
more polluting ones.
As expected, from the mid 2020s onwards tailpipe NO
X
 
emissions decreased more in the 2030 scenarios (between 7 % 
and 26 % by 2030, and between 55 % and 100 % by 2050, when 
compared to the Reference case) than in the 2040 scenarios 
(between 0 % and 8 % by 2030, and between 34 % and 94 % 
by 2050). Similarly, tailpipe PM
2.5
 emissions decreased more in 
the 2030 scenarios (between 10 % and 22 % reductions over 
baseline by 2030, and between 69 % and 100 % by 2050) than 
in the 2040 scenarios (between 0 % and 5 % by 2030, and be-
tween 52 % and 91 % by 2050). he R2Z (ICE ban 2040) only 
shows air pollution beneits from the late 2030s onwards. his 
suggests that in order to reduce the health burden of road traic 
pollution faster, the earlier transformation to a cleaner ULEV 
vehicle leet may be more efective than existing government 
strategy (R2Z, UK Air Quality Strategy) that implies breaching 
international AQ limits may continue well into the 2030s. 
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Figure 3. Scenario comparison of direct NO
X
 (left) and PM
2.5
 (right) emissions from cars and vans.
Figure 2. Scenario comparison of tailpipe (left) and life cycle (right) CO
2
e emissions from cars and vans.
6. TRANSPORT AND MOBILITY
 ECEEE SUMMER STUDY PROCEEDINGS 1123 
6-309-19 BRAND, ANABLE
CHANGES IN ENERGY DEMAND AND ROAD FUEL DUTY REVENUES 
In the short term (until about 2025) all scenarios showed a 
gradual decrease in overall energy use, which is due to im-
provements in vehicle energy eicient outpacing increases in 
demand for car (+6 % between 2015 and 2025) and van (+16 %) 
travel (Figure 4). Demand for electricity was marginal except 
for the 2030 bans of hybrids and plug-in hybrids. 
In the medium to longer term the modelling showed modest 
(2030) to large (2050) decreases in energy consumption due to 
the uptake of more energy eicient plug-in vehicles (Figure 4). 
Energy demand reductions and fuel switching away from fos-
sil fuels was largest in the more stringent and earlier scenarios 
(ICE+HEV ban 2030, ICE+HEV+PHEV ban 2030), with ener-
gy demand from cars and vans (in PJ) decreasing by up to 74 % 
by 2050 when compared to 2015; this contrasts to a decrease 
of 36 % by 2050 in the Reference scenario. By 2050, fossil fuel 
demand decreases further from -40 % in the Reference case to 
-63 % (ICE ban 2040), -89 % (ICE+HEV ban 2040) and -100 % 
(ICE+HEV+PHEV ban 2030). By comparison, electricity de-
mand grows steeply from a low base of only 0.5 PJ in 2015, 
particularly in the second half of the period. By 2050, electricity 
use accounted for the majority of energy use in the scenarios 
that phase out conventional ICE and HEV (between 247 PJ and 
315 PJ, compared to 57 PJ in the Reference case). By contrast, 
fossil fuels still dominate energy use in 2050 in the less ambi-
tious scenarios, including the R2Z case (ICE ban 2040).
In 2017, GBP 21.1 Billion were raised from cars and vans 
through road fuel duty, which was almost entirely from the 
duty on gasoline and diesel of GBP 0.58/litre (HM Treasury 
2018), with electricity being duty and tax free. his road tax 
revenue stream would not change signiicantly in the short term 
across the scenarios. However, in the medium term to 2035 the 
modelling suggests that road tax revenues would fall sharply 
to about GBP 7.4 Billion p.a. (ICE+HEV ban 2030), and even 
lower to £6.1 Billion p.a. in the stringent ICE+HEV+PHEV ban 
2030 scenario. By 2050, this revenue stream would virtually be 
wiped out in all scenarios that ban conventional ICE and HEV 
cars and vans. 
DISRUPTIVE OR CONTINUOUS CHANGE?
Legislated bans on the sale of new conventional fossil fuel vehi-
cles will involve a purposive transition, by which we mean high 
levels of coordination and intention within the system rather 
than an emergent transformation. Of course, we may experi-
ence system shocks with potentially smaller reach or signii-
cance not just within system, also from outside the system. Yet, 
given the nature of legislation and providing a policy signal for 
future change we propose that the bans investigated here are 
elements of a purposive transition.
In terms of the types of change, the above results suggest that 
in the R2Z (ICE ban 2040) pathway the actors of the car and 
van transport and energy system are likely to undergo continu-
ous rather than disruptive change. his is due to the relative 
slow and limited evolution of the leet towards ‘unconventional’ 
low carbon fuels, continuation of fuel duty revenue streams 
well into the 2040s and little additional reductions in energy 
demand and air pollutant emissions. However, in the earlier 
(2030) and stricter (in ULEV terms) pathways we can expect 
some disruption for technology providers, industry and busi-
ness, in particular vehicle manufacturers, global production 
networks, the maintenance/repair sector as well as the oil & gas 
industry. his has been mapped in Figure 5.
However, the stronger policy signal of a 2030 ban that in-
cludes hybrids would provide certainty to manufacturers to 
invest and innovate, backed up by much improved market 
conditions for EVs that go beyond the R2Z strategy, incl. in-
creased consumer awareness through marketing and aware-
ness campaigns, increased and earlier certainty of access for 
leet operations, higher battery capacities, charging rates and 
faster of-street parking from the mid-2020s onwards. If the 
UK succeeded in phasing out conventional and hybrid EV cars 
and vans, the oil and gas industry would gradually lose a major 
demand sector at potentially disruptive rates of change in the 
medium term (2030 and beyond). At the same time, central 
government would lose fuel duty revenue streams worth Bil-
lions of pounds a year, unless fossil fuel duty is replaced with (a 
yet non-existent) electric fuel duty. While this has been recog-
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Figure 4. Transport energy demand from cars and vans (in PJ) for the main transport fuels.
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nised as a potentially disruptive change (Howard et al. 2017), 
others argue that the loss of fuel duty does not matter economi-
cally (BVRLA 2019). 
For other actors, particularly consumers and leasing com-
panies, ULEVs represent continuous change as “a car is still 
a car” in most respects as we assume no signiicant advances 
in and uptake of shared mobility and automation6, which are 
the other two major innovations that have disruptive potential 
(Sprei 2018) and are of emergent property. here will also be 
continuous change for local government (key actor in deliv-
ering charging infrastructure) and wider civil society, with air 
quality improvements expected to change gradually and in the 
second half of the assessment period, even in the most stringent 
scenarios. So, overall we found that the purposive transition of 
the proposed bans are less radical or disruptive as the system 
would be able, as a whole, adapt and change within the existing 
socio-technical system (Figure 5).
Conclusions
his paper set out to investigate transitions away from carbon-
intensive car and van transport by exploring ‘disruptive’ rates 
of change in comparison with ‘natural’ rates of change in the 
transport-energy system. It used prospective scenario analy-
sis and an established modelling tool to represent and explore 
‘disruptive’ change in a transport energy system and to explore 
scenarios of disruptive and more incremental change in decar-
bonising car and van based transport in the UK.
he transport sector has 10 years to achieve 40 years-worth 
of carbon reductions if the latest warnings from the IPPC on 
the need for ‘rapid and far reaching actions’ are to be taken 
seriously. For cars and vans, the scenario modelling shows that 
existing policy (‘Road to Zero’: ICE ban by 2040) may neither 
6. The two other so-called transport revolutions, Connected and Autonomous 
Vehicles and shared mobility, were considered but ultimately excluded from the 
analysis in order to keep the paper focussed on legislative bans and the phasing 
out of fossil fuel technology. Further work is underway to examine the combined 
efects of all three aspects. 
hit the target nor make the early gains needed for a 1.5 °C tra-
jectory, suggesting that the target for phasing out convention-
ally fuelled vehicles may be inadequate and not it with our 
emissions targets. he 2040 date should be brought forward 
and linked to accelerated investment in networks and charging. 
he results of the earlier (2030) and more stringent (in ULEV 
deinition terms) policies suggest that we may not necessarily 
need radical change in the car and van market – at least not 
disruptive for most actors in the socio-technical system.
Deep reductions in carbon emissions can be achieved by 
more ambitious but ‘continuous’ change, with a stronger pol-
icy signal of a 2030 ban that includes (plug-in) hybrids. his 
would provide certainty to manufacturers to invest and inno-
vate, backed up by much improved market conditions for EVs. 
his would also bring multiple beneits (air pollution, as shown 
here, but also noise pollution and other co-beneits) for users 
and wider society as a whole. Government, however, would 
need to devise alternative revenue streams to the Billions it gets 
from fossil fuel duty. Equally, the manufacturing and mainte-
nance industries would need to develop and adapt faster in the 
most ambitious cases. Yet we believe the more ambitious transi-
tion is feasible technically, economically and socially.
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Appendix
A1 SCENARIO DESCRIPTIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
he Reference scenario was modelled using TEAM-UK based 
on exogenous assumptions and projections of socio-demo-
graphic, economic, technological and (irm and committed) 
policy developments. Transport demand, supply, energy use 
and emissions were calibrated to UK national statistics for 
the base year of 2012. We obtained Special Licence Access to 
the National Travel Survey dataset (Department for Transport 
2016) and used SPSS v23 to derive average trip rates, distance 
travelled and mode splits for the UK. Economic growth data 
up to 2017 were based on government igures. Future GDP/
capita growth were assumed to average 1.35 % p.a. up to 2050. 
Transport demand projections were modelled based on no 
changes in trip patterns (i.e. trips and distance travelled per 
person p.a., and mode split) apart from lower commuting 
levels due to an ageing population, and average demand elas-
ticities (of GDP/capita, population and generalized cost) for 
international air and freight transport (Dunkerley et al. 2014; 
Sims et al. 2014). Fuel price and retail electricity price projec-
tions were based on 2017 UK Government forecasts (BEIS 
2017). Annual road tax and road fuel duties were assumed to 
remain constant at 2018 levels. For cars, we assumed a gradual 
decrease to zero by the late 2020s of the UK’s existing ‘plug-in 
vehicle grant’, which will pay for 35 % of the purchase price 
for vehicles have CO
2
 emissions of less than 50g/km and can 
travel at least 112 km (70 miles) without any CO
2
 emissions 
at all, up to a maximum of £3,500. hese are essentially BEVs. 
For PHEVs, the grant pays up to £2,500. For vans, the grant 
will pay for 20 % of the purchase price for vehicles that have 
CO
2
 emissions of less than 75 g/km and can travel at least 
16 km (10 miles) without any CO
2
 emissions at all, up to a 
maximum of £8,000. hese are essentially BEVs, apart from 
the Mitsubishi Outlander PHEV Commercial, a popular 
choice in the UK market.
Pre-tax vehicle purchase costs were kept constant over time 
for conventional ICE technologies and gradually decreased for 
advanced and future technologies, thus exogenously simulat-
ing improvements in production costs, economies of scale and 
market push by manufacturers. For example, average purchase 
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prices for BEV cars were assumed to decrease by 2.8 % pa from 
2015 to 2020, by 1.6 % pa until 2030 and 0.6 % pa until 2050, 
based on projected BEV battery cost reductions (Nykvist et al. 
2019).
he scenario set further assumed gradual improvements in 
speciic fuel consumption and tailpipe CO
2
 emissions per dis-
tance travelled (see Supplementary Materials in Brand et al. 
2017). he rates of improvement were based on technological 
innovation driven entirely by market competition, not on pol-
icy or regulatory push. Fuel consumption and CO
2
 improve-
ment rates for future car vintages were assumed to be 1.5 % 
p.a. – a somewhat lower and more conservative rate than the 
average rate of 4 % p.a. based on test-cycle data for all new 
cars between 2008 and 2013. his is reasonable assumption 
as ‘real world’ improvements have been signiicantly lower, as 
shown by ICCT (ICCT 2014, 2016, 2017). Indirect emissions 
from fuel supply and vehicle manufacture, maintenance and 
scrappage were based on data from a UK-based review (Kay 
et al. 2013). 
Alternative ‘ban’ scenarios
he alternative ban scenarios focus on regulatory and supply-
side measures against conventional fossil fuel and for plug-in 
technologies. Depending on the policy ambition (target date, 
ULEV deinition), these scenarios implied signiicant invest-
ment and repositioning towards ULEVs by the main vehicle 
manufactures with ultra-low emission vehicles (ULEVs) be-
ing available in all car segments (e.g. ‘supermini’, ‘large family’, 
‘crossover’) and by all major brands by the target dates; ‘univer-
sal’ consumer awareness and acceptance of ULEV cars by the 
target dates driven by comprehensive awareness campaigns and 
the ‘neighbour efect’ (Mau et al. 2008). he regulatory ‘sticks’ 
and policy signals are balanced by the carrots of signiicant 
investment in recharging infrastructure (home charging, fast 
charging stations in and beyond the UK); improved certainty of 
access to charging for leet operators; and reduced (perceived) 
recharging times. No improvement in so-called ‘equivalent 
value support’ (taxation, fuel duty) for ULEVs for both private 
and company/leet buyers was assumed.
